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Abstract
Using spatial variation in World War I military fatalities in France, we
show that the scarcity of men due to the war generated an upward shift
in female labor force participation that persisted throughout the interwar
period. Available data suggest that increased female labor supply accounts
for this result. In particular, deteriorated marriage market conditions for
single women and negative income shocks to war widows induced many of
these women to enter the labor force after the war. In contrast, demand
factors such as substitution toward female labor to compensate for the
scarcity of male labor were of second-order importance.
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“The major fact will be a breakdown of the equilibrium between
sexes. There will not be enough suitors for all young women searching
for a husband. [...] The prospect of remaining single will induce most
young women to worry about getting an occupation to make their
living and to be self-sufficient.”
Arthur Girault, Revue d’Économie Politique, 1915, 29(6), 443–444.
1. Introduction
The dramatic rise of female labor force participation has been one of the most
significant changes to labor markets in the past century (Olivetti and Petron-
golo, 2016). This “quiet revolution” has been mostly interpreted as a consequence
of long-run trends in technological change (Goldin, 2006).1 Less understood is
the role of idiosyncratic historical events such as shocks to the adult sex ra-
tio, which can at times stall or propel the secular march toward gender equal-
ity by disrupting labor market conditions both in the short and the long run
(Angrist, 2002; Grosjean and Khattar, 2019; Teso, 2019). Indeed, implications
of such imbalances and the mechanisms through which they materialize are often
challenging to identify because they typically result from factors that gradually
shape labor market structures as well (Qian, 2008; Carranza, 2014).
In this article, we provide evidence that jolts of history can generate rapid
and long-lasting changes to women’s involvement in the economy. We overcome
identification issues by using World War I (WWI) in France as a severe exogenous
shock to the adult sex ratio and show that it generated a persistent upward
shift in female labor force participation during the interwar period. While WWI
ravaged continental Europe between 1914 and 1918, France suffered an especially
high death toll relative to other belligerent countries. Because of a universal
conscription system, most French male citizens were drafted throughout the war:
out of 10 million men aged 15 to 50 before the war, 8 million were drafted in
the army. 1.3 million died in combat; a military death rate of 16 percent. As a
1For instance, the increasing availability of household appliances liberated women’s time for
market work (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, 2005). Alternatively, the structural trans-
formation increased the supply of service sector jobs, in which women have a comparative
advantage (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017).
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result, the sex ratio among adults aged 15 to 50 dropped from 98 men per 100
women at the onset the war to 88 by the end of the war. It was not until after
World War II (WWII) that the sex ratio reverted back to balance (Figure 1).
Our empirical strategy exploits differential changes in female labor force par-
ticipation rates before and after the war across départements that experienced
different military death rates.2 Key to our contribution, we collected the individ-
ual military records of these 1.3 million missing men to build a precise measure
of military death rates at the département level. While the relationship between
military death rates and changes in female labor force participation rates was
flat between 1901 and 1911, it exhibits a positive slope of 0.4 between 1911 and
1921 (Figure 2). Difference-in-differences estimates confirm this relationship: in
départements that experienced military death rates of 20 percent rather than
10 percent—equivalent to switching from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the
distribution—female labor force participation rates were 3.5 percentage points
higher throughout the interwar period; an increase of 11 percent relative to pre-
war levels. 80 percent of the effect we identify stems from women entering the
industrial sector, with a shift of the labor force toward blue-collar occupations
and self-employment.
Next, we explore the validity of identifying assumptions. Military death
rates were not randomly distributed: they were greater in rural départements
due to the policies implemented by the Ministry of War to sustain the industrial
war effort. Importantly, this does not invalidate our identification strategy as
military death rates were not correlated with pre-war trends in female labor
force participation. Allowing for département-specific time trends, region-by-
year fixed effects, or time-varying heterogeneity across départements (Bonhomme
and Manresa, 2015) generates results that are in line with the baseline estimate.
Moreover, an instrumental variables strategy that exploits discontinuities in the
timing of military service across cohorts yields similar results.
Data available for this time period suggest that supply factors related to
changes in post-war marriage market conditions constitute a potentially impor-
2Départements constitute the second level of France’s administrative subdivisions, between ré-
gions and arrondissements. They are broadly comparable to English and US counties, German
Landkreises, and Spanish provincias. There were 87 départements before the war.
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tant explanation for the patterns we identify. In particular, information on
female labor force participation among widowed women imply that these women
were responsible for nearly half of the overall impact of WWI military fatalities
on female labor force participation. We interpret this result as the consequence
of increased labor supply due to negative income shocks experienced by war
widows, whose pensions remained very low until the early 1930s. We also find
that single women in départements more affected by the war delayed marriage,
which likely induced them to enter the labor force while searching longer for a
husband. In contrast, our analysis suggests that labor demand factors were of
second-order importance: while post-war female employment rose, female wages
declined in the manufacturing sector as well as in the domestic services sector
across occupations in which men and women were closer substitutes. Therefore,
substitution of firms from male labor to female labor was likely limited. To com-
pensate for the scarcity of the male labor input, firms instead slightly increased
their stock of physical capital. Finally, we find no evidence that female wartime
employment was correlated with military death rates, nor that it generated a
rise in female labor force participation after the war.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
our contributions and the related literature, Section 3 describes the data and
historical context, Section 4 presents the main results, Section 5 explores the
mechanisms, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Contributions and Related Literature
We contribute to the literature that explores implications of war mobilization
and fatalities on female labor force participation. Starting with Goldin (1991),
this literature has extensively focused on the case of WWII in the U.S., broadly
suggesting that wartime mobilization generated an inflow of women into the la-
bor force and that some of them kept working after the war (Acemoglu, Autor,
and Lyle, 2004; Goldin and Olivetti, 2013; Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz, 2015).
Rose (2018) nuances these findings: using direct measurement of female work
during the war and of the drafting process, he shows that female wartime em-
ployment had little overall effects on female labor force participation after the
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war beyond a reallocation of female jobs from the non-durable manufacturing
sector to the durable manufacturing sector. He further highlights that the corre-
lation between female wartime employment and war mobilization is much weaker
than previously thought. Finally, he finds no relationship between WWII mili-
tary fatalities and post-war female labor force participation. Our study provides
renewed evidence for the consequences of wars on female labor force participa-
tion, albeit in a different context: while as Rose (2018), we find no evidence for
a relationship between female wartime employment and post-war female labor,
we show that the permanent loss of men due to the war generated a substantial
inflow of women into the labor force after the war.
In that respect, our analysis helps clarify historical debates. Perhaps
prompted by aggregate trends in female labor force participation that rapidly
reverted to pre-war levels, contemporaneous historiography has emphasized that
WWI in France was far from an engine of liberation for women (Thébaud, 2014).3
The surge in female employment during the war was indeed short-lived. Never-
theless, by comparing relative changes in female labor force participation across
départements that were differentially affected by military fatalities, our study
paints a nuanced picture: the war increased women’s presence in the labor force,
but only as a result of disruptions that mostly materialized after the war.
Implications of WWI in France for marriage and fertility outcomes have also
been the subject of recent research. Most related to our article, Abramitzky,
Delavande, and Vasconcelos (2011) show that women in regions that experienced
greater military death rates faced deteriorated post-war marriage prospects.4
To explain post-war patterns in fertility and female marriage choices, Vanden-
broucke (2014) and Knowles and Vandenbroucke (2019) build and calibrate mod-
els of fertility choices and marital matching. All three studies rely on military
fatalities data from Huber (1931, p. 426), which are only available across 22 re-
gions and the accuracy of which has been challenged by historians (Prost, 2008).
3For instance, Françoise Thébaud concludes her seminal study by “[t]he war, which brought
hundreds of thousands of women into factories and male sectors, appears as a parenthesis”
(Thébaud, 2013 [1986], p. 406).
4The consequences of male scarcity due to WWII for family formation and fertility have also
been studied in the contexts of Bavaria, the U.S., and Russia (Bethmann and Kvasnicka, 2013;
Jaworski, 2014; Brainerd, 2017).
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Besides studying alternative consequences of the war over a longer time horizon,
our analysis employs a measure of military death rates that builds upon the col-
lection of 1.3 million individual military records. Our measure is therefore more
accurate than that in the literature as it varies across 87 units rather than just
across 22. In fact, we show that variation in the Huber (1931) data is insufficient
to precisely identify the effect of WWI military fatalities on female labor force
participation.
Our study also contributes to our understanding of the consequences of per-
manent sex ratio imbalances on female labor force participation. Economic the-
ories of marriage imply that the scarcity of one gender impacts women’s working
behaviors through its effects on marriage market conditions. For instance, in
Grossbard’s (2014) demand and supply model of marriage, a scarcity of men
decreases the implicit market price of women’s work in the household, which
in turn increases women’s supply of labor through an income effect. Collective
models of household labor supply yield similar conclusions (Chiappori, 1992).
These theoretical predictions have been tested using various sources of variation
in sex ratios, such as natural fluctuations in cohort sizes or migration shocks. For
instance, exploiting sex ratio differences across cohorts in the U.S. between 1965
and 2005, Amuedo-Dorantes and Grossbard (2007) find a negative correlation
between sex ratios and women’s participation in the labor force. Alternatively,
Angrist (2002) shows that changes in immigrants’ sex ratios in the U.S. between
1910 and 1940 induced second-generation immigrant women to marry more of-
ten, contributing to a decline in their participation in the labor force.5 These
permanent disruptions to sex ratios usually materialize progressively, generating
equilibrium responses over time. Furthermore, they are typically the product of
factors that also shape labor market structures, making it challenging to identify
the mechanisms through which they translate (Qian, 2008; Carranza, 2014). We
overcome these identification issues by using a permanent source of variation
in adult sex ratios that is sharp—military fatalities were concentrated within
a period of 4 years—large in magnitude, and exogenous to the outcome under
5Another strand of literature relies on temporary variations in sex ratios. For instance, Charles
and Luoh (2010) find that rising male incarceration rates in the U.S. affected women’s working
behaviors through their impact on marriage market conditions.
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scrutiny.
Imbalances in sex ratios can further have far-reaching consequences for
women’s involvement in the economy. For instance, the scarcity of men in Africa
due to the transatlantic slave trade between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries
resulted in higher participation of women in the labor force today (Teso, 2019).
Conversely, the scarcity of women in Australia due to the arrival of predominantly
male British convicts throughout the nineteenth century resulted in lower partic-
ipation of women in the labor force today (Grosjean and Khattar, 2019). Little is
known about the mechanisms that induced these long-run relationships to emerge
in the first place: the historical nature of these phenomena generally implies a
substantial lack of data at the time of the initial imbalance, preventing a proper
analysis of the short-run mechanisms at play around the historical shock. This
lack of quantitative evidence might jeopardize the validity of such persistence
studies, and in particular the credibility of their exclusion restrictions (Cantoni
and Yuchtman, 2019). By uncovering the initial channels through which sex
ratio imbalances due to the war affected women’s working behaviors in interwar
France, our analysis provides sound foundations for exploring the mechanisms
of long-run persistence of this historical episode. Such is done in Gay (2019),
which shows that this historical shock to female labor transmitted to subsequent
generations until today, mainly through parental intergenerational transmission
channels. Overall, our article constitutes an important foundation to studies
focused on the medium and long-run consequences of gender imbalances in that
it provides quantitative evidence for the mechanisms through which the relation-
ship between male scarcity due to the war and female labor force participation
emerged in the first place.
3. Data and Historical Context
3.1. Female Labor Force Participation (1901–1936)
Female labor force participation data at the département level are from the
seven censuses between 1901 and 1936.6 While farmers’ wives were to be clas-
6Census years are 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936, the last census before WWII.
Appendix J provides comprehensive details about the sources of data used in this article.
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sified as labor force participants, not all census enumerators did so in 1901
(Maruani and Meron, 2012, pp. 33–35). For consistency in measurement, the
analysis focuses on female labor force participation net of farmers’ wives. Because
these women were systematically classified as farm owners whenever recorded,
we avoid potential measurement error by removing them from the labor force, as
nearly all female farm owners were farmers wives. Moreover, this transformation
enables us to focus on paid work.
Female labor force participation is the share of women aged 15 and above in
the labor force.7 Table 1 reports average female labor force participation rates
from 1901 to 1936. While many women entered the labor force right after the war,
at least as many had dropped out by the late 1920s. Table 1 further motivates our
focus on female labor net of farm owners: while the corrected measure remains
stable at 33 percent between 1901 and 1906, the uncorrected measure increases by
7 percentage points between these two censuses. Since there was no major shock
to labor market conditions during this period, the discrepancy appears solely
due to inconsistent measurement in 1901. After 1901, the difference between the
two measures remains stable around 20 percentage points, suggesting that the
transformation we operate does not introduce systematic biases.
3.2. Military Death Rates
To build a precise measure of military death rates at the département level,
we collected the individual military records for the 1.3 million French soldiers
who died because of the war from the Mémoire des Hommes archive maintained
by the Ministry of Defense.8 We then extracted their dates and départements
of birth. The military death rate in a département is calculated as the ratio of
deceased soldiers born in that département to the size of its drafted population,
7This includes employed and unemployed women. Little unemployment benefits existed so in-
dividuals had seldom incentives to register—female unemployment rates were below 1 percent.
8This archive is accessible at http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr. Ap-
pendix I provides more details about this database and discusses its advantage over Huber
(1931, p. 426). The number of soldiers who ultimately died as a result of the war remains
uncertain as some passed several years after due to injuries or illnesses contracted during the
conflict, but the figure of 1.3 million is the consensus (Prost, 2008). It is similarly difficult to
assess the number of civilian fatalities; they are usually evaluated at 40,000 (Huber, 1931, pp.
310–314).
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which we approximate by the male population aged 15 to 44 in 1911. This
approximation is reasonable because all French male citizens aged 20 to 48 were
subject to conscription at the onset of the war.
In Figure 3, we map the distribution of military death rates.9 Military death
rates range from 6 percent in Belfort to 29 percent in Lozère, with an average
of 15 percent. Throughout the article, we interpret regression coefficients by
comparing differences in outcomes across départements that experienced high
military death rates (20 percent) rather than low military death rates (10 per-
cent). This roughly corresponds to switching from a median département in the
low military death rates group (25th percentile) to a median département in the
high military death rates group (75th percentile).
Two types of inaccuracies could potentially affect the measure of military
death rates. First, we assign military fatalities to a département through soldiers
départements of birth. However, these might have differed from their départe-
ments of residence at the onset of the war as 19 percent of men aged 15 to 44
resided outside their département of birth in 1911. This could be problematic if
pre-war migration flows were correlated with trends in female labor force partici-
pation. To alleviate this concern, we build a measure of military death rates that
corrects for these patterns. Estimates with this corrected measure are similar to
the baseline.
A second potential issue concerns the approximation of the pool of drafted
men. We assume that men subject to conscription were drafted at similar rates
across départements. However, 21 percent of them were initially exempted,
mainly due to poor health (Huber, 1931, p. 93).10 Using military recruitment
data by cohort together with health information, we show that differential re-
cruitment rates across départements do not affect the results.
9Data are missing for the three départements that belonged to Germany before the war—Bas-
Rhin, Haut-Rhin, and Moselle. They are excluded throughout the analysis.
10Recruitment rates nevertheless increased throughout the conflict as many conscripts previously
deemed “unfit” were eventually recalled to compensate for heavy military casualties. For
instance, 92 percent of the cohort aged 20 in 1914 was eventually drafted (Boulanger, 2001,
pp. 118–128). Another potential concern might be that men under 20 and over 48 voluntarily
enlisted. These were relatively rare: while 26,000 men out of 188,000 conscripts voluntarily
enlisted in 1914, only 11,000 out of 211,000 did so in 1915 (Boulanger, 2001, pp. 128–136).
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3.3. Sources of Variation in Military Death Rates
The distribution of military death rates was determined by the territorial
organization of military recruitment, and by demographic and economic fac-
tors. Rural départements experienced greater military death rates, a correlation
generated by the policies implemented by the Ministry of War to sustain the
industrial war effort. Nevertheless, the distribution of military death rates was
not correlated with pre-war trends in female labor force participation.
The territorial organization of military recruitment The territorial or-
ganization of the military structured both the recruitment and composition of
military units. These were initially composed with soldiers residing in same mil-
itary region, so that soldiers from the same region were initially sent to the same
battlefields. As a result, départements in different military regions experienced
disparate military death rates. However, as casualties accumulated, the military
command changed this affectation policy: after only five months into the war,
soldiers were allocated based on each unit’s needs so that troops from different re-
gions were increasingly mixed together (Boulanger, 2001, p. 253). The resulting
intra-regional correlation in military death rates is therefore low at 0.12.
Economic and demographic factors The systematic part of the variation
in military death rates can be explained by demographic and economic factors.
To see that, we regress military death rates on pre-war characteristics and report
estimates in Table 2.11 Départements that experienced greater military death
rates had lower female labor force participation rates before the war (column
1) and were more rural (columns 2). Rurality is captured through two mea-
sures: the share of rural population and the share of population born in the
département.12 Together, these two measures explain 74 percent of the varia-
11The full set of results for Table 2, column 3, is available in Appendix Table A.1.
12Censuses define as “rural” the population that resides in municipalities with less than 2,000
inhabitants. The share of population born in the département is tied to fundamental aspects
of French rurality as a measure of the intensity of the rural exodus during the late nineteenth
century (White, 2002). Average personal wealth, the share of active population in agriculture,
and the share of cultivated land also capture some aspects of rurality, but all the variation in
these variables is subsumed in variations in the two measures we propose.
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tion in military death rates across départements. Pre-war differences in female
labor force participation that are correlated with military death rates are fully
captured by differences in rurality: the coefficient on female labor force partici-
pation is non significant and close to zero once rurality is controlled for (column
3). When 17 additional pre-war characteristics are further included, only rural-
ity exhibits statistical significance, and corresponding coefficients barely change
(column 4). Finally, including 21 military region fixed effects to compare neigh-
boring départements generates similar estimates (column 5).
The policies implemented by the Ministry of War to sustain the industrial
war effort explain the correlation between military death rates and rurality. As
the war lingered, the military command realized that its plan for supplying
troops with weapons and machinery was dramatically insufficient (Porte, 2005,
pp. 73–82). For instance, the plan of military mobilization did not mention
the production of new military equipment, providing only for 50,000 workers
allocated across 30 factories (Porte, 2006, p. 26). To cope with the shortage
of civilian labor and the German occupation of the industrial North-East, as
early as August 1915, the Ministry of War began to withdraw soldiers with
manufacturing skills from the front and sent up to 560,000 of them into war
factories and mines.13 Moreover, administrative jobs were mostly occupied by
soldiers with higher formal education, those from urban areas (Ridel, 2007).
Because of these policies, soldiers from industrial and urban départements were
less likely to be on the battlefield and thus had lower chances of dying in combat.
Such correlation in levels need not threaten the identification as long as the
distribution of military death rates is not correlated with trends in female labor
force participation. Figure 4 displays absolute and relative trends in female labor
force participation rates across three groups, each composed by 29 départements
that experienced by high, medium, and low military death rates. Départements
13The Dalbiez law of August 17, 1915, stipulates: “The Ministry of War is authorized to al-
locate to corporations, factories, and mines working for the national defense men belonging
to a mobilized or mobilizable age class, industrial managers, engineers, production managers,
foremen, workers, and who will justify to have practiced their job for at least a year in those
corporations, firms and mines, or in comparable corporations, firms, and mines” (art. 6, Jour-
nal Officiel de la République Française, Lois et Décrets, 47 (223), pp. 5785–5787, dated August
19, 1915). Appendix Table A.2 provides a detailed account of the number of mobilized soldiers
outside of armed services throughout the war.
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with different military death rates had different levels in female labor force par-
ticipation rates (panel a), but they had little differential trends in female labor
force participation in the pre-war period (panel b).
4. The Missing Men and Female Labor Force Participation
To analyze the effect of military fatalities on female labor force participation,
we use a difference-in-differences strategy and estimate the following baseline
specification:
(1) FLFPd,t = β death_rated × postt + θ
′Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t,
where FLFPd,t denotes the female labor force participation rate in département d
and year t in percent, and postt, an indicator variable for t > 1918. We cluster
standard errors at the départment level throughout the analysis. Département
fixed effects γd control for département-specific unobservable characteristics that
are fixed over time and might generate systematic differences in levels of female
labor force participation. For instance, some départements might hold more
traditional views about gender roles than others and exhibit systematically lower
female labor force participation rates. Time fixed effects δt control for year-
specific shocks that are common to all départements. Xd,t is a vector containing
the two time-varying measures of rurality.
Identification stems from relative changes in female labor force participation
rates across départements with different military death rates. The baseline esti-
mate is reported in Table 3, column 1. In départements that experienced military
death rates of 20 percent rather than 10 percent, female labor force participation
was 3.5 percentage points higher after the war; an increase of 11 percent relative
to pre-war levels. Removing time-varying controls does not affect this estimate
(column 2).
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βτ death_rated × yearτ + θ
′Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t,
where we exclude the year 1911, and where yearτ is set of indicator variables for
each year between 1901 and 1936. Estimates are displayed in Figure 5. They are
stable throughout the interwar period. Coefficients on pre-war years are close
to zero and non significant, suggesting that differential pre-war trends in female
labor force participation do not drive the results. They are nonetheless slightly
positive: for instance, the coefficient on the lead of 1906 is 0.03 (standard error
of 0.05). This implies that départements that experienced greater military death
rates had a slight relative downward trend in female labor force participation
before the war, which could bias post-war estimates downward. In section 4.1, we
show that the parallel-trends assumption is nonetheless justified in this context.
Decomposition by age Female labor force participation rates for decennial
age groups 20–29, 30–39, and 40–49, are available in the census of 1901 and in
all post-war censuses. We re-estimate the baseline specification on the sample of
women aged 20 to 49 and obtain an coefficient of 0.40, close to the baseline (Ap-
pendix Table A.3, column 1). Although older women responded relatively more
intensively to military fatalities than younger women did (columns 2–4), base
rates in labor force participation across groups imply that all ages contributed
equally to the overall effect (columns 5–7).
Decomposition by sector and occupation In Appendix B, we decompose
the overall effect by sector and occupation. 80 percent stems from women en-
tering the industrial sector, while the remainder essentially stems from women
entering the domestic services sector. Moreover, we observe a displacement of
the female labor force toward blue-collar occupations and self-employment in
départements that experienced greater military death rates, especially in the
industrial sector. These results suggest that women mostly entered low-skilled
12
jobs after the war.14
4.1. Robustness
We perform a wide range robustness checks that are summarized in Table 3,
columns 3–11. These checks, as well as additional ones performed in Appendix,
are described below.
Parallel-trends assumption We provide evidence that the parallel-trends
assumption is reasonable in this context. The baseline point estimate does
not change significantly when we control for département-specific linear time
trends or region-by-year fixed effects, or when we purge military death rates
from pre-war trends in female labor force participation and rurality (columns
3–5).15 Excluding départements in the higher group of military death rates re-
sults in pre-war trends that are flat at zero and in estimates that are only slightly
larger than the baseline (Figure 4). In Appendix C, we further show that our
results are robust to explicitly relaxing the assumption that time fixed effects
are common to all départements: herein, we allow for time-varying heterogene-
ity across départements using Bonhomme and Manresa’s (2015) grouped fixed
effects strategy, which imposes no a priori structure on group membership.
Measurement of female labor force participation Using alternative mea-
surements of female labor force participation does not alter the results. Estimates
are similar to the baseline when we exclude unemployed women and when we
include female farm owners (columns 6–7).
War départements Consequences of the war might have been different in
départements that experienced war combats directly if military death rates were
correlated with the intensity of war destruction or the reconstruction. Excluding
these eleven départements from the analysis decreases the point estimate to 0.28
14In Appendix H, we use individual-level data on the cohorts 1899–1908 from the census of 1968
to show that this did not affect these women’s educational attainment.
15Controlling for département-specific quadratic, cubic, or quartic time trends yields identical
point estimates at 0.47, with standard errors of 0.16.
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(column 8). This is because these départements were predominantly industrial,
and female labor was mostly responsive to military fatalities in the industrial
sector. It nevertheless suggests that war départements are not driving the results.
Using data from Michel (1932), we further show that the distribution of war
destruction and of the reconstruction effort across these départements was not
correlated with military death rates (Appendix D).
Pre-war migration patterns We assign military fatalities to a département
through soldiers départements of birth, which might differ from their départe-
ments of residence at the eve of the war. This could introduce bias in the
baseline estimate if military death rates and pre-war migration patterns were
correlated. To alleviate this concern, we construct a measure that takes into
account bilateral migration flows between départements in 1911 (Appendix E).
Using this corrected measure generates a point estimate close to the baseline
(column 9).16 We also show that a measure based on départements of military
recruitment rather than départements of birth is contaminated with substan-
tial measurement error because the geography of military recruitment did not
overlap département boundaries.
Additional robustness checks In Appendix F, we show that differences in
enlistment rates due to pre-war differences in health conditions were uncorre-
lated with military death rates and changes in female labor force participation.
Herein, we further provide evidence that the distribution of death rates due to
the Spanish Flu of 1918–1919 was uncorrelated with military death rates and did
not affect changes in female labor force participation. We also show in Appendix
Table A.4 that our results are robust to alternative specifications of standard er-
rors: two-way clustering on départements and years (Cameron and Miller, 2015),
region-level clustering, and spatial autocorrelation (Conley, 1999). Furthermore,
column 10 of Table 3 reports a population-weighted regression estimate. It is
16Trends in female migration patterns were not altered by the war (Appendix Figure A.1).
Re-estimating the baseline specification with the share of women born in their département of
residence as the dependent variable results in a weak and non-significant estimate of 0.08 (stan-
dard error of 0.11). This alleviates the concern that post-war labor mobility might confound
the results.
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slightly larger than baseline at 0.48 as more populated départements were rel-
atively more industrial. Finally, a placebo test shows that military death rates
did not affect male labor force participation rates (column 11).
4.2. Instrumental Variables Strategy
To further support the validity of the baseline OLS point estimate, we use
an instrumental variables strategy that exploits discontinuities in the timing of
military service across cohorts. At the onset of the war, the active army was
composed by four age cohorts: men aged 20 to 23, born between 1891 and
1894. We label an age cohort by the year in which it was first drafted—the
year it reached age 20. For instance, the class 1914 denotes the cohort of 1894.
Hence in 1914, the active army was composed by classes 1911 to 1914. While
the class 1914 had just been recruited, the class 1911 had gone through three
years of military training and was about to be transferred to the reserve of the
active army. As a result, men of classes 1911 to 1914 had different levels of
military training at the onset of the war. They nevertheless belonged to the
same military units and were initially sent to the same battlefields. Intuitively,
men with more military training should be more “efficient” on the battlefield
and die at lower rates.17 Consistent with this idea, discontinuities in the number
of military fatalities across cohorts are apparent in Figure 6.18 We argue that
these discontinuities are due to differences in military training.
Other reasons could potentially explain these differences. First, members
of each class could have different initial physical or intellectual abilities. To
examine this possibility, we collected height and education data from recruitment
reports of the army. Summary statistics, reported in Appendix Table A.5, clearly
reject this possibility. Second, older soldiers might have died at lower rates than
younger ones because of better physical abilities or some form of seniority.19
17The contribution of each class to military fatalities is indeed monotonically increasing from the
class 1911 to the class 1914: the class 1911 contributed 5.7 percent to overall military fatalities;
the class 1912, 6.2 percent; the class 1913, 6.5 percent, and the class 1914, 6.7 percent.
18This is not driven by cyclical birth patterns, as the same pattern holds when we weight military
fatalities by the number of birth in each month.
19Guillot and Parent (2018, p. 428) show that soldiers in higher ranks had a longer life expectancy
during the war, although the difference is small.
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Averaging military death rates over an entire class might in this case yield the
patterns we observe in the data. However, differences in military fatalities across
classes are not driven by an averaging effect, as cohort-specific regression lines
in Figure 6 do not display positive slopes.
We build on these discontinuities and create three instruments, each repre-
senting the size of a cohort relative to the next in 1911. We show in Appendix
G that these instruments are nearly randomly distributed and are not correlated
with pre-war levels in female labor force participation and rurality. They are
however strongly correlated with military death rates: first-stage estimates re-
ported in panel A of Table 4 imply that the larger the size of a class relative to
the next, the smaller the military death rate. Moreover, they exhibit Kleibergen-
Paap F-statistics between 11 and 56, suggesting little bias at the second stage.
Using all three instruments together implies that in départements that expe-
rienced military death rates of 20 percent rather than 10 percent, female labor
force participation was 5.4 percentage points higher after the war (Table 4, panel
B, column 4). This is larger than the baseline OLS estimate—though not statisti-
cally different—for potentially three reasons: downward bias in the OLS estimate
due to the slight relative downward trend in female labor force participation in
départements that experienced greater military death rates, measurement error
in military death rates, or the larger responsiveness of female labor force partici-
pation to the death of younger soldiers if the main mechanism operates through
the marriage market.
In Appendix G, we further show through a series of placebo tests that only
the class ratios we consider generate meaningful results. We also show herein
that instrumental variables estimates are robust to the same robustness checks
as those reported in Table 3 and to alternative specifications of the instruments.
5. Mechanisms
We now investigate the mechanisms that could explain the impact of WWI
military fatalities on female labor force participation. Both changes in the supply
and demand for female labor could account for the pattern we identify. On
the one hand, the scarcity of men might have induced firms to increase their
16
demand for female labor, especially in sectors in which women and men were
close substitutes. On the other hand, shocks to the marriage market might have
induced women to increase their overall supply of labor through two mechanisms.
The first consists in differential base rates in labor force participation across
marital statuses. As apparent on Appendix Figure A.2, at the national level,
single and widowed women had much larger propensities to work than married
women throughout the period. Therefore, a decline in the proportion of married
women due to the war should have mechanically increased overall female labor
supply. The second consists in changes in the relative intensity of female labor
supply within each marital group due to negative income shocks. For instance,
some war widows might have entered the labor force to compensate for the
loss of their husbands’ incomes as their pensions remained low until the early
1930s (Bette, 2017). This negative income shock might also have induced their
daughters to enter the labor force as secondary earners in their families.
We explore whether supply (Section 5.1) or demand channels (Section 5.2)
help explain the pattern we identify. Empirical evidence points towards a supply-
side explanation, although the absence of systematic information on female labor
force participation by marital status at the département level prevents us from
providing definitive evidence. In Section 5.3, we also show that female wartime
employment cannot explain post-war changes in female labor force participation.
5.1. Supply Factors: A Marriage Market Channel?
Military fatalities and the post-war marriage market We first document
the consequences of military fatalities for the post-war marriage market.20 The
primary channel through which the war affected the marriage market is changes
in sex ratios. To illustrate the impact of military death rates on adult sex ratios,
20We are not the first to document this phenomenon. Using a more aggregated source of data for
military death rates (Huber, 1931, p. 426), Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos (2011)
show that women were less likely to marry after the war in regions that experienced greater
military death rates. We replicate their main result (Table 2, p. 136) using our measure of
military death rates in Appendix Table A.6.
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βτ death_ratea,d × yearτ + γd + δt + µa + εa,d,t,
where sex_ratioa,d,t denotes the sex ratio among age group a in département d
and year t in percentage points, and yearτ , a set of indicator variables for each
year between 1901 and 1946. To improve the precision of estimates, we compute
decennial-cohort specific sex ratios and military death rates for age groups 20–29,
30–39, and 40–49, and include age-group fixed effects µa. Moreover, we include
the year 1946 to assess the long-run consequences of the war. Estimates are
displayed in Figure 7. Coefficients on pre-war years are flat at zero but strongly
negative after the war. In particular, in départements that experienced military
death rates of 20 percent rather than 10 percent, the sex ratio among adults aged
20 to 49 decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 1911 and 1921. Coefficients
then revert to balance over time, reaching zero in 1946. This suggests that the
marriage market remained disrupted throughout the interwar period, but that
these disruptions had dissipated by the end of WWII.
Consistent with these sex-ratio effects, the share of married women aged 20
to 49 declined from 71 percent in 1911 to 66 percent in 1921. At the same time,
the share of single women among this age group increased from 22 percent to
24 percent, while the share of widowed women increased from 6 percent to 9
percent (Appendix Figure A.3).
To analyze the impact of WWI military fatalities on the interwar marriage
market, we estimate the following specification:
(4) Ym,d,t = β death_rated × postt + θ
′Xd,t + γd + δt + εm,d,t,
where Ym,d,t denotes the share of women aged 20 to 49 of marital status m,
in département d and year t in percent.21 We report results in panel A of
21We focus on this sample because age groups outside these bounds are not consistently defined
across censuses. Marital statuses “widowed” and “divorced” are generally not available sep-
arately in the censuses, so we group widowed and divorced women into the same category.
Moreover, because age groups within the 20–49 bounds were defined differently in the census
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Table 5. Estimates imply that in départements that experienced military death
rates of 20 percent rather than 10 percent, the share of single women was 2.3
percentage points higher after the war, an increase of 10 percent relative to pre-
war levels (column 1). In these départements, the share of widowed women was
0.7 percentage point higher after the war, an increase of 13 percent (column
2). Mirroring these trends, the share of married women in these départements
was 3.1 percentage point lower after the war, a decline of 4 percent (column
3). Our analysis suggests that three quarters of these “missing married women”
were single women who did not marry, while the rest were married women who
became widows.
Estimates generally do not change significantly when we control for
département-specific linear time trends or region-by-year fixed effects, or when
we purge military death rates from pre-war trends in female labor force partic-
ipation and rurality (Appendix Table A.7). Moreover, year-specific coefficients
reveal no pre-war differential trends in marriage market outcomes, suggesting
that the parallel-trends assumption is again reasonable (Appendix Figure A.4).
To explore which age groups quantitatively contribute the most to these esti-
mates, we repeat the analysis by decennial age group, keeping the denominator
equal to the female population aged 20 to 49. We find that the increase in the
share of single women was mostly driven by younger women, aged 20 to 29, while
the increase in the share of widowed women was driven by older women, aged
40 to 49 (Appendix Table A.8).
Marriage market conditions remained disrupted throughout the interwar pe-
riod, with rates of singlehood still increasing in the 1930s in départements rel-
atively more affected by the war. In Appendix H, we explore the consequences
of the war for family formation in more details by using individual-level data
from the family survey of 1954 and the census of 1968. We focus on the cohorts
most directly affected by the war, the cohorts 1899–1908. Confirming findings
in Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos (2011, pp. 147–148), we show that
women in départements relatively more affected by the war delayed marriage
and child bearing. These marriage market effects were not permanent, however,
of 1906, this year is excluded from the sample.
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as rates of permanent singlehood among these women were not affected. This
suggests that marriage market disruptions due to the war remained confined to
the interwar period.
The marriage market as a transmission channel Data to directly identify
labor supply channels through changes in marriage market conditions are limited
as censuses do not provide information on female labor force participation by
marital status at the département level. The family surveys of 1901, 1926, and
1936 nevertheless provide information on employment status of widows at this
level of aggregation.22 This enables us to assess the role of war widows for the
overall effect of WWI military fatalities on female labor force participation.
We first re-estimate the baseline effect when using only censuses of 1901,
1926, and 1936, and obtain an estimate of 0.26 (Table 5, column 4). Repeating
the analysis with the share of active widows among all women as the dependent
variable generates an estimate of 0.12, which implies that widowed women ac-
counted for nearly half of the overall effect of WWI military fatalities on female
labor force participation (column 5). This can be explained not only by the in-
crease in the share of widowed women in the population, which are structurally
more likely to work than married women, but also by the increase in labor force
participation rates among these women. Indeed, we find that in départements
that experienced military death rates of 20 percent rather than 10 percent, la-
bor force participation rates among widowed women increased by 5.4 percentage
points, an increase of 16 percent relative to pre-war levels (column 6).
We interpret these results as the consequence of increased labor supply due
to negative income shocks experienced by war widows, whose pensions remained
low until the early 1930s (Bette, 2017). Tracking social security laws promul-
gated throughout the interwar period, we estimate that pensions to a war widow
amounted to a quarter of the average labor income of a working woman dur-
ing the 1920s (Appendix Figure A.5). This suggests that a substantial number
of war widows had to enter the labor force to compensate for the loss of their
22Family surveys provide information on widows but not on married or single women because
they focus on family heads, and widows constitute the only category of women that was
considered as such by official statistics.
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husbands’ incomes.
Although département-level information on labor force participation rates of
single women do not exist, our analysis in Appendix H highlights that they de-
layed marriage, potentially spending more time searching for a husband. This
might have induced some of them to enter the labor force as well, at least tem-
porarily.23
5.2. Demand Factors: A Substitution Channel?
The increase in female labor force participation during the interwar period
might also be explained by firms substituting male labor with female labor to
cope with the scarcity of men. In a partial equilibrium framework, an increase
in female wages could uncover this phenomenon. However, we documented that
women increased their overall supply of labor after the war because of changes
in marriage market conditions. As a result, changes in wages can only provide
a partial view: on the one hand, rising female wages would imply that the
increase in the demand for female labor was strong enough to overcompensate
the depressing effect of increased female labor supply on wages and, on the other
hand, declining female wages would imply that the potential increase in the
demand for female labor was not large enough to compensate the depressing
effect of increased female labor supply on wages.
To overcome general equilibrium effects, we analyze changes in female wages
across occupations with different degrees of substitutability between male and
female labor. We first consider occupations in the textile manufacturing sector
that were almost exclusively occupied by women: ironers, seamstresses, and
milliners.24 Hourly wage rates for these occupations are available at the city
level between 1901 and 1926.25 Focusing on these occupations enables us to fix
23Historical accounts support the idea that the market place was a platform to meet a husband.
For instance, a female factory superintendent recounts the following in the 1930s: “[...] the
young [female workers] prefer working at the factory than in their homes. Young women
consider [the factory] as an occasion to get married” (Delagrange, 1934, p. 39).
24In 1911, there were about 260 women per man in these occupations (Résultats Statistiques du
Recensement Général de la Population 1911, Tome I, Partie 3, p. 28).
25In fact, these are the only female occupations for which wage rates are available throughout
this time period. Available years are 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, and 1926. Wage information for
other female occupations in the manufacturing sector (laundresses, lacemakers, embroiderers,
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the demand curve for female labor: because male and female labor were not
substitutes in these occupations, the scarcity of men is unlikely to have affected
the demand for female labor differentially across departments. As a result, only
shifts in the female labor supply curve should have influenced female wages in
these occupations.
We aggregate city-level hourly wage rates at the département level and use a
difference-in-differences strategy analogous to specification 1. We report results
in panel A of Table 6. Consistent with our argument, female wages declined
across all occupations in départements that experienced greater military death
rates. Year-specific estimates reveal no differential pre-war trends in wage rates
across départements, suggesting that the parallel-trends assumption is reasonable
(Appendix Figure A.6). While these occupations are not representative of all
female occupations, they are representative of a large share of jobs women held
throughout this time period, especially in the manufacturing sector. Given that
the impact of the war was especially salient in that sector of activity, these results
imply that labor supply factors alone might constitute a first-order explanation.
Next, we consider occupations in the domestic services sector in which male
and female labor were closer substitutes: cooks and housekeepers. Annual wage
rates for these occupations are available at the city level in 1913 and 1921. We
transform these into hourly wage rates assuming 2,808 annual working hours
(Bayet, 1997, p. 26). Focusing on these occupations provides an upper bound
for the potential role of changes in labor demand through substitution. Similar to
the analysis above, we aggregate city-level hourly wage rates at the département
level and use a difference-in-differences strategy. We report results in panel B
of Table 6. Again, female wages declined across all occupations in départements
that experienced greater military death rates.
These results suggest that increased female labor supply might have been
the driving force behind the post-war increase in female labor force participa-
tion. Nevertheless, increased labor demand through substitution appears to have
played a (limited) role in the domestic services sector. Indeed, the net magni-
tude of the negative impact of military fatalities on female wages was smaller
and vest makers) is only available for the 1920s. Such wage information is not available for
the 1930s.
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in this sector than in the textile manufacturing sector: while in départements
that experienced military death rates of 20 percent rather than 10 percent, fe-
male wages declined by 8 to 12 percent in the textile manufacturing sector, they
declined by 2 to 6 percent in the domestic services sector.
A concern might be that wage movements were driven by declining demand
for goods and services due to a decline in income in départements more affected
by military fatalities. If this were the case, then at least male labor force par-
ticipation rates would have decreased. But they remained unchanged (Table
3, column 9), while female labor force participation rates increased. Moreover,
wages in sectors producing non-tradable goods would have declined relatively
more than in sectors producing tradable goods. But female wages in the do-
mestic services sector declined relatively less than those in the manufacturing
sector.
Finally, firms did not substitute toward foreign labor, as neither labor force
participation rates of foreigners nor their share in the population changed across
départements that experienced different military death rates (Table 6, panel C).
Available data suggests that firms instead compensated for the scarcity of male
labor by increasing their stock of physical capital, as total engine power and
engine power per worker in the industrial sector increased more after the war in
départements that experienced greater military death rates (Table 6, panel D).
However, the magnitudes of these effects remained limited.
5.3. Female Wartime Employment
We now examine whether WWI military fatalities affected female labor force
participation through female wartime employment. Belligerent nations antici-
pated a short war: since the middle of the nineteenth century, military strategies
used strong initial attacks to rapidly defeat opponents (Van Evera, 1984). Con-
sistent with this doctrine, the French plan of military mobilization did not specify
an industrial organization that would support a potentially long war, so that the
industrial system nearly came to a halt in August 1914. Figure 8 displays trends
in operating firms along with male and female employment in the industrial sec-
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tor during the war.26 Half of industrial firms ceased operating in August 1914,
and male and female employment respectively declined to 32 percent and 43
percent of their levels of July 1914.
By the end of August 1914, 200,000 French soldiers had died in combats. The
military command soon realized that the war would last longer than anticipated
and that its industrial plan to support the ongoing war effort was dramatically
insufficient. For instance, while 13,000 shells were produced daily at the be-
ginning of the war, troops were using 150,000 shells per day by January 1915
(Porte, 2005, pp. 66–67). To manage the extended needs of the army, the mil-
itary command centralized the industrial war effort under the State Secretariat
of Artillery and Ammunition in November 1915 and started to coordinate a
vast network of public and private industrial firms (Bostrom, 2016). Moreover,
the government incentivized firms to employ alternative forms of labor such as
women, immigrants, and war prisoners. As a result, the number of women em-
ployed in the industrial sector exceeded its pre-war level by July 1916. This was
especially salient in sectors that directly supplied weapons and machinery to the
army. For instance, in the metallurgic sector, the number of employed women
exceeded its pre-war level as early as January 1915, and was nearly 700 percent
higher by July 1917.27
The need for new military equipment vanished at the end of the war. More-
over, the government issued laws to help soldiers return to their pre-war jobs,
even offering monetary lump sums of a month pay to women who would quit
their jobs in war industries.28 As a result, female employment in the industrial
26Data are from five industrial surveys conducted in July 1917, January 1918, July 1918, January
1919, and July 1919.
27Appendix Table A.9 provides an overview of the evolution of the number of women employed
across various industries during the war.
28The law of November 22, 1918, ensured that soldiers could claim their pre-war job: “The
administrations, offices, public, or private firms must guarantee to their mobilized personnel
[...] the occupation that all had at the moment of its mobilization” (Journal Officiel de la
République Française, Lois et Décrets, 50 (320), pp. 10120–10121, November 24, 1918). In
November 1918, the Ministry of Armament was telling female workers: “[b]y coming back to
you previous occupations, you will be useful to your country as you have been by working
in war industries in the past four years. [...] Each [female] worker who expresses the will to
quit one’s firm before December 5, 1918, will receive the amount of thirty days of salary as a
severance pay” (Bulletin du Ministère du Travail, 1919, pp. 45*–46*).
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sector dropped below its pre-war level by January 1919.
Women who entered the labor force during the war might have kept working
after the war because they acquired valuable skills and experience, updated their
beliefs about the benefits from working, or improved their information about la-
bor market conditions. We capture the relative intensity of female wartime em-
ployment with the percentage change of women working in the industrial sector
between July 1914 and July 1917, or June 1918. Départements that experienced
greater increases in female employment during the war did not experience dif-
ferent military death rates (Table 7, panel A). Hence, the potential impact of
female wartime employment on subsequent female labor force participation is
orthogonal to the mechanisms we highlight.
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we further find that départements
with greater increases in female wartime employment did not experience a post-
war rise in female labor force participation (Table 7, panel B). Including an
interaction term between military death rates and increases in female wartime
employment does not affect the results. Similarly, we find no effect of female
wartime employment on the distribution of occupations or sectors of activity
(Appendix Table A.10). These findings are consistent with contemporaneous
reports of labor inspectors, which recount how managers systematically divided
tasks of female workers.29 Because of this division of labor, women could hardly
acquire human capital transferable to other sectors after the war (Downs, 1995).30
These results parallel those in Rose (2018), who finds that female wartime em-
ployment during WWII in the U.S. was orthogonal to soldiers mobilization and
did not affect post-war female labor.
29For instance, a labor inspector in a report of January 1918 describes: “[t]o make female labor
possible and enable [women] to replace men, industrialists have, in many regions, modified and
improved their managing methods. They divide labor to the extreme, organize production in
series and assign female workers to very delimited tasks” (Bulletin du Ministère du Travail et
de la Prévoyance sociale, 25 (1), 1918, p. 11).
30Historians have further pointed out that instead of an inflow of women in the labor force, women
employed in war factories were already working before the war. For instance, Downs (1995, p.
48) writes: “In the popular imagination, working women had stepped from domestic obscurity
to the center of production, and into the most traditionally male of industries. In truth, the war
brought thousands of women from the obscurity of ill-paid and ill-regulated works as domestic
servant, weavers and dressmakers into the brief limelight of weapons production” (cited in
Vandenbroucke, 2014, p. 118).
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6. Conclusion
In this article, we show that the scarcity of men due to World War I in France
induced many women to enter the labor force after the war. In départements
that experienced military death rates of 20 percent rather than 10 percent, fe-
male labor force participation increased by 11 percent relative to pre-war levels.
This effect is stable throughout the interwar period and robust to alternative
empirical strategies. Available data for this time period suggest that labor sup-
ply factors (changes in marriage market conditions) rather than labor demand
factors (substitution from male to female labor) help explain the pattern we
identify.
This study provides evidence that jolts of history can generate rapid and
long-lasting changes to women’s involvement in the economy. Yet, the response
of female labor to sex ratio imbalances we identify was arguably amplified by the
historical context in which it occurred: most women were not in the labor force
at the time, and low-skilled jobs in the manufacturing sector were increasingly
available because of the transition toward Taylorism during the interwar period
(Downs, 1995). As a result, changes in marriage market conditions profoundly
affected the extensive margin of female labor. Analyzing the impact of WWI
military fatalities on female labor across countries with different characteristics
might be crucial to better understand dependencies between the mechanisms we
highlight and the historical context, and to gauge the external validity of our
findings.
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Figure 1. Adult Sex Ratio (1900–2012)
Notes. This figure displays the sex ratio among French adults aged 15 to 50. Data are from
the censuses 1900 to 2012. Vertical lines indicate WWI (1914–1918) and WWII (1939–1945).
1901 FLFP mean = 32.9%
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Figure 2. WWI Military Death Rates and Changes in FLFP
Notes. FLFP denotes female labor force participation rates in percent. Each dot represents
one of 87 départements. The vertical axis represents changes in female labor force participation








Figure 3. Distribution of Military Death Rates Across 87 Départements
Notes. Data are missing for Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, and Moselle. Shaded areas in the North-
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(b) Relative Trends
Figure 4. Trends in Female Labor Force Participation
Notes. This figure displays absolute and relative trends in female labor force participation
rates between 1901 and 1936 across groups of 29 départements with high, medium, and low
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Figure 5. Impact of WWI Military Fatalities on FLFP
Notes. This figure reports year-specific OLS coefficients from estimating specification 2. The
dependent variable is female labor force participation (FLFP) in percent. Controls include
the share of rural population in percent and the share of population born in the département
in percent. Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Exclude high group corre-
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Figure 6. Military Fatalities by Month of Birth, Classes 1911–1914
Notes. Each dot represents the number of military fatalities relative to soldiers born during
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Figure 7. Impact of WWI Military Death Rates on Adult Sex Ratios
Notes. This figure reports year-specific OLS coefficients from estimating specification 3. The
dependent variable is the sex ratio among adults aged 20 to 49 in percentage points. Shaded
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Figure 8. Labor During World War I (August 1914–July 1919)
Notes. Female denotes employed women; Male, employed men; Firms, operating firms. Data
are relative to the industrial sector. Levels are normalized to 100 in July 1914.
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Table 1. Average Female Labor Force Participation Rates
1901 1906 1911 1921 1926 1931 1936
FLFP (net of farm owners) 32.9 32.7 31.4 35.0 29.9 30.1 28.1
FLFP (uncorrected) 45.0 51.9 51.5 55.7 49.6 49.4 47.0
Difference 12.1 19.2 20.1 20.7 19.7 19.3 18.9
Notes. This table reports average female labor force participation (FLFP) rates
in percent across 87 départements.
Table 2. Military Death Rates and Pre-War Characteristics
Dependent variable: Military death rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FLFP -0.15*** 0.03 -0.06 -0.01
[0.05] [0.03] [0.07] [0.07]
Rural 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.16***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.04]
Born in dép. 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.11*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.06]
Other characteristics No No No Yes Yes
Military region FE No No No No Yes
Départements 87 87 87 87 87
Adj. R2 0.120 0.739 0.739 0.790 0.838
Notes. This table reports OLS estimates from regressing military death rates
on département characteristics measured in 1911. FLFP denotes female la-
bor force participation in percent; Rural, the share of rural population in
percent; Born in dép, the share of population born in the département in
percent. Other characteristics consist of population in thousands, population
per km2, average age, average height in cm, the share of active population in
industry in percent, km of roads and km of rails per km2, the share of cul-
tivated land in percent, personal wealth, banking deposits, and direct taxes
in francs per inhabitant, the share of population that can read and write
and the share of population with primary education in percent, the mini-
mum distance to the war in km, the share of students in religious schools in
percent, turnout in 1914 in percent. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3. Impact of WWI Military Fatalities on FLFP
Dependent variable: FLFP MLFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Death rate × post 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.21*** 0.23** 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.28*** 0.55*** 0.48*** -0.01
[0.07] [0.08] [0.15] [0.08] [0.09] [0.07] [0.10] [0.07] [0.13] [0.07] [0.06]
Controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Specification Baseline No Dépt.- Region Residual Empl. Female No war Correct. Pop. Male
controls specific × year measure farm dépt. measure weights placebo
trends FE owners
Difference 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.15 -0.13 0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.20 0.13 -0.36***
from baseline [0.10] [0.16] [0.10] [0.11] [0.10] [0.12] [0.10] [0.15] [0.10] [0.09]
Observations 609 609 609 609 609 609 522 532 609 609 609
Départements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 76 87 87 87
Within R2 0.581 0.578 0.824 0.798 0.550 0.584 0.606 0.633 0.569 0.636 0.675
1911 mean 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.1 51.5 31.4 31.4 31.4 93.2
Notes. This table reports OLS coefficients from estimating specification 1. The dependent variable is female labor force participation rate
in percent except in column 6, where it is female employment rate in percent, and in column 11, where it is male labor force participation
rate in percent. All regressions include département and year fixed effects. Controls include the share of rural population in percent and the
share of population born in the département in percent. Census years are 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. Column 3 includes
département-specific linear time trends, and column 4, region-by-year fixed effects. In column 5, military death rates are purged from
pre-war trends between 1901 and 1911 in FLFP and rurality. In column 7, female labor force participation includes female farm owners and
excludes census year 1901. In column 8, all eleven départements that experienced war combats on their territory are excluded. In column 9,
military death rates are corrected for pre-war migration patterns (see Appendix E). In column 10, départements’ relative population sizes
in 1911 are used as weights. Standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at the département level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 4. Instrumental Variables Estimates
A. First Stage
Dependent variable: Military Death Rate × Post
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ratio class 1911–1912 × post -0.28*** -0.17***
[0.05] [0.03]
Ratio class 1912–1913 × post -0.39*** -0.31***
[0.05] [0.06]
Ratio class 1913–1914 × post -0.31*** -0.20***
[0.10] [0.05]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 609 609 609 609




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Death rate × post 0.35*** 0.80*** 0.48*** 0.37** 0.54***
[0.07] [0.22] [0.14] [0.18] [0.13]
Instrument No 1 2 3 1–3
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference with OLS 0.00 0.44 0.13 0.02 0.19
[0.23] [0.16] [0.19] [0.15]
Observations 609 609 609 609 609
Départements 87 87 87 87 87
Within R2 0.581 0.507 0.575 0.581 0.567
KPW F-statistic 29.159 55.847 10.638 27.350
Notes. This table reports first-stage coefficients in panel A, and IV coefficients from
estimating specification 1 with class ratios as instruments in panel B. Instrument 1
is the ratio of the class 1911 to the class 1912; Instrument 2, the ratio of the class
1912 to the class 1913; Instrument 3, the ratio of the class 1913 to the class 1914. All
regressions include département and year fixed effects, and controls for the share of rural
population in percent and the share of population born in the département in percent.
FLFP denotes female labor force participation in percent. All regressions contain 87
départements. Census years are 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. The
KPW F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic. Standard errors are in
brackets and are clustered at the département level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 5. The Marriage Market Channel
A. Marital Status B. Labor Force Participation
Dependent variable: Single women / Widowed women / Married women / Active women / Active widows / Active widows /
all women all women all women all women all women widows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Death rate × post 0.23*** 0.07*** -0.31*** 0.26*** 0.12*** 0.54***
[0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.07] [0.03] [0.11]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 522 522 522 261 261 261
Départements 87 87 87 87 87 87
Within R2 0.693 0.864 0.763 0.604 0.325 0.609
Pre-war mean 22.3 5.6 71.4 32.9 5.7 34.5
Notes. This table reports OLS coefficients from estimating specification 4 in panel A and specification 1 in panel B. All regressions include
département and year fixed effects, and controls for the share of rural population in percent and the share of population born in the
département in percent. Shares are in percent, and are defined with respect to the female population aged 20 to 49 in panel A and the
female population aged 15 and above in panel B. Census years are 1901, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936 in panel A, and 1901, 1926, and
1936 in panel B. Standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at the département level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 6. Impact of WWI Military Fatalities on Wages, Foreign Labor and Capital
A. Manufacturing Log Wages B. Domestic Log Wages C. Foreign Labor D. Engine Power
Ironer Seamstress Milliner Cook Housekeeper LFP Share pop. Log total Per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Death rate × post -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.008** -0.006*** -0.002* -0.11 -0.08 0.03** 6.58***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.22] [0.06] [0.01] [2.37]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 386 395 366 173 171 261 609 261 261
Départements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Within R2 0.951 0.955 0.951 0.901 0.948 0.468 0.640 0.858 0.249
Pre-war levels 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.13 35.0 2.26 29,782 35.76
Notes. This table reports OLS coefficients from estimating specification 1. All regressions include département and year fixed effects,
and controls for the share of rural population in percent and the share of population born in the département in percent. The
dependent variable is log hourly wage rate in columns 1–5; labor force participation rates of foreigners in percent in column 6; the
share of foreigners in the population in percent in column 7; the log total power of engines in kW in column 8; and the power of
engines per 100 workers in the industrial sector in kW in column 9. Survey years are 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, and 1926 in columns
1–3; 1913 and 1921 in columns 4 and 5; 1911, 1921, and 1926 in columns 6 and 7; and 1901, 1906, and 1926 in columns 8 and 9.
Standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at the département level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 7. Military Death Rates and Female Wartime Employment
Dependent variable: A. Death rate B. FLFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wartime employment -0.00 -0.00
[0.01] [0.01]
Wartime employment × post -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02
[0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.04]
Death rate × post 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.36***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Wartime employment × 0.00 0.00
Death rate × post [0.00] [0.00]
Reference date 07–1917 07–1918 07–1917 07–1917 07–1918 07–1918
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 87 87 609 609 609 609
Départements 87 87 87 87 87 87
Adj./Within R2 0.745 0.746 0.582 0.582 0.581 0.582
Notes. Panel A reports OLS coefficients from regressing military death rates on changes in female
employment in percent between July 1914 and July 1917 in column 1 and between July 1914 and
July 1918 in column 2. Panel B reports OLS coefficients from estimating specification 1. All
regressions include controls for the share of the rural population in percent and the share of the
population born in the département in percent. In panel B, regressions include département and
year fixed effects. FLFP denotes female labor force participation in percent. In panel A, we
report the adjusted-R2, and robust standard errors are in brackets. In panel B, we report the
within-R2, and standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at the département level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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